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UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
IN A CARIBBEAN INDUSTRY

CHUKS OKPALUBA*

INTRODUCTION
In his recent work on Labour Relations in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Dr. Zin Henry' revealed that unfair and abusive employment prac.
tices of one kind or another are common and pervasive among the
Caribbean employers. While some of these employers do not attempt
2
to disguise their purpose, others do so by subtle means.
Dr. Henry is not alone in his observation for there are indications
that most of the labour disputes in the region occur because of the attitude of the employers.3 The case of Trinidad and Tobago is in point.
After recounting the experience of the Industrial Court over the first
four years of its existence, the President stated:
Past experience over the years has made it tolerably plain that
employers tend to allow too many avoidable disputes to reach
4
the Court.
This statement is based on the fact that trade unions successfully established the justness of their grievances against employers in a large number
of disputes determined by that Court as illustrated by the following
table :5

Year

No. of Disputes
Determined

No. wholly in
favour of
employers

1967
1968
1969

109
188
152

23
26
13

No. partially
in favour of
employers

No. wholly
against
employers

10
2
2

*Lecturer in Labour Law, University of the West Indies, Barbados.

76
160
137
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Separate and apart from the Industrial Court's records of bad employment practices on the part of the employeus there are other sources;
i.e., reports of Boards of Enquiry. The most recent among a host of
such Commissions of Enquiry Reports' revealing acute and deplorable
employment practices in the Commonwealth Caribbean are the following:

1.

The Denbow Report7

After many years of "discontent, distrust and disillusionment" at the
Georgetown waterfront, the Minister of Labour and Social Security appointed a Board of Enquiry to investigate every aspect of the industry
with a view to improving its efficiency. Among others, the Commission
was to enquire into the adequacy of the existing machinery for dealing
with industrial relations matters, investigate the system of employment of
dock labour and the method and adequacy of remuneration of employees
at the waterfront.
In its mammoth report,8 the Commission found, among other things,
that one of the major grievances of the waterfront workers, and one that
generated a great deal of ill-will and dissatisfaction, was the alleged "highhandedness" characterizing the attitude of employers. There was uncertainty and absence of job-security to the extent that persons already
sixty-five felt compelled to continue working in order to be assured of
their livelihood for fear of getting no pension income after retirement.
There was inconsistency and absence of uniformity in the system of paying wages, conditions of employment, and status of workers. The method
of remuneration of workers employed by the waterfront contractors was
most unsatisfactory. Workers in many cases were not certain who was
member company of the Shipping Association or the
their employer -the
private contractor. To register their dissatisfaction with these practices,
the workers indulged in a number of restrictive practices the result of
which was to slow down productivity in the industry.9
2.

The Henry Report'0

The Henry Report, tabled in the House of Representatives of Trinidad and Tobago by the Minister of Labour, Social Security and Co-operatives, Hon. Hector McLean on 16th March, 1973,11 is the latest report
dealing with the kind of experiences under consideration. Since the revelation by this Commission of undesirable employment practices could
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hardly pass unnoticed, this article discusses its findings and examines the
recommendations which the Commission made for the purposes of remedying the highly unpalatable employment practices existing in the Trinidad and Tobago contracting industry.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
HENRY COMMISSION
Barely three years after its establishment, the facts of the unfair,
undesirable and exploitative employment practices prevalent in the contracting industry of Trinidad and Tobago began to unfold in the proceedings before the Industrial Court. It is therefore not surprising that
in a judgement delivered by the President on January 9, 1968, the Court
observed that from experience it was clearly perceptible that:
Contractors can do virtually anything they please with persons seeking employment with them and nevertheless escape the consequences
of their indulgence in anti-union activities and their perpetration
2
of social injustice.'
The Court further observed that conditions of employment in contracting undertakings were most deplorable, exploitative and uncommendable, at any rate, in "a free, advanced and democratic society"
whose Constitution expressly proclaims that labour should not be exploited. 3 The Court thought that in order to eradicate and prevent further perpetration of such evils, social injustices and malpractices against
the workers, the adequate and only remedy would be legislation. Accordingly, the Court very strongly recommended that Government:
steps to investigate these evils fully and thereafter
- . . take urgent
to introduce such legislation as may be appropriate.' 4
These views were reiterated in several and subsequent judgements of the
Court."
As a result of these remarks, the Cabinet on June 19th, 1969 appointed an ad hoc Committee headed by the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security 16 to
conditions of employment of workers employed by
- . . investigate
contractors and matters relevant thereto and to make recommendations.
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Like the recommendations of the Industrial Courts, already noted, the
ad hoc Committee urged that a Commission of Enquiry be appointed
under the Commission of Enquiry Ordinance 17 since such a Commission
could investigate more authoritatively as well as the undesirable features of the system of contracting out of work, and the acute competition
for contracts and their "adverse consequences" for workers especially
those employed by small contractors.
These recommendations culminated in the appointment of a threeman Commission of Enquiry by the Governor-General of Trinidad and
Tobago on September 23rd, 1971. The Commission, chaired"5 by Dr.
Zin Henry of the Industrial Court, was assigned the duty of inquiring
. . . into the consequences for workers, particularly those employed
by small contractors, resulting from the acute competition for contracts; and other undesirable features of the system of contracting
out work.19
FACTORS GENERATING UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
IN THE INDUSTRY
In Trinidad and Tobago, there are two major systems of contracting out work, namely, in the public and in the private sectors. Contract.
ing in the public sector is regulated by an Ordinance of 1961 as amended
in 1965, and regulations made thereunder. 20 These Ordinances enjoin the
Tenders Board- a body established by the 1961 Ordinance-to award
public contract work to the lowest tender unless it can show good reason
for doing otherwise.
As the Henry Commission found, this statutory requirement is responsible for the acute and "cut-throat" competition that has developed
in the industry. Tenders that are known to the Board to be "ridiculously
low" are nevertheless accepted. The consequence is that the contractors
tender terms knowing them to be unrealistic and below the average
labour cost. The "lowest tender" principle has brought about the existence
of a number of so-called "fly-by-night" contractors. These contractors are
said to operate with the barest minimum of capital, if they have capital
at all. They have no equipment and their ad-hoc workers are sometimes
required to provide their own tools. The result is that the contractors
indulge in all sorts of "oppressive and immoral" practices. In order to
ensure some profit margin, they pay sub-marginal wages.
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There is no legislative regulation of tender and award of contracts
in the private sector. Therefore, each company or firm determines its
own criteria for contracting out work but the Commission was able to
find that the "lowest tender" rule is also applied in the private sector "as
a matter of policy by private companies."
As will be observed later in this article, the Commission's investigation revealed that one of the principal generators of the exploitative practices complained of is the system of sub-contracting out work under which
the contractor supplies only labour on request to the company awarding
the contract, the so-called Labour - Supply - Only Contract.
The fact that a large number of contractors and sub-contractors are
not only financially weak but are also "devoid of managerial or administrative experience," is another factor contributing to undesirable labour
conditions in the industry. The majority of the contractors who fall
within this description have small businesses. In effect their survival,
even on the face of the acute competitive market, must depend, therefore,
not upon their efficiency but upon their ability to maneuver and manipulate labour through various unethical devices. For instance, they generally
operate from home and therefore have no plant sites to maintain.
Although there are two organisations of contractors in Trinidad and
Tobago,21 yet neither of these organisations exercises any effective control over its members. This absence of control aggravates the phenomenon
of acute and "cut-throat" competition among the contractors. There is,
therefore, no effective organisation in the industry to bring about improved and uniform working conditions for workers. Nor is there any
evidence that any of these associations, or indeed, any of the contracting
firms was in any way affiliated to the Trinidad and Tobago Employers'
Consultative Association.
Similarly, the absence of unionisation among the workers of the
contracting industry,
.. . provide the other blade of the scissors which serves to carve out
unstable industrial relations in the contracting industry.
The evidence before the Commission showed that out of the twenty-two
relatively large contractors in the country, at least fifteen of them were
found to be non-unionised and only four were fully unionised and operating collective agreements or in the process, as it were, of negotiating an
agreement. But in the medium-sized and small contracting firms, there
was a total absence of unionisation.
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The impact of unionisation on human relations within these undertakings would not only be to minimise the number of employment grievances of the workers, but also to bring their employment grievances within
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. It is necessary to note that the
industrial relations law of Trinidad and Tobago thrives where there is
unionisation since a worker as an individual cannot initiate trade dispute
litigation in the Industrial Court even though the grievance concerns him
personally. 22 Thus, the trade disputes that have reached the Industrial
23
Court have been processed by trade unions.
Quite apart from the fact that the Industrial Court is not per se open
to the individual worker, there are regrettable omissions in the Industrial
Relations Act, 1972, of Trinidad and Tobago, at least, from the individual
worker's point of view. For instance, the Act makes no provision for
the protection of the individual worker who is not a member of a trade
union or whose employment undertaking is not unionised. Under these
circumstances, his employment grievances could only be heard in the
Industrial Court if he could get a trade union to take it up. In strict
legalism this may appear to be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution
for a citizen is free to join or not to join an association. In the context of
the Act, the worker does not appear to have any choice for it seems that
he is compelled directly or indirectly to associate. In practice however,
he is the one to benefit, for trade unions bridge the gap between the
bargaining might of the employer and the weak bargaining power of the
individual employee. Trade unions bargain on behalf of their members for
conditions and hours of work, and for holidays with pay. They bargain
for virtually all sorts of fringe benefits (as illustrated by the agreement
between Federation Chemicals Ltd. and the Oilfields Workers' Trade
Union) 2 4 whereas in non-unionised undertakings employment conditions
tend to be dependent upon the whims, fancies and idiosyncracies of the
individual employer. In this instance, the experiences of the contracting
industry provide materials for case study.
Another point which is worthy of note in connection with the omissions in the Industrial Relations Act is that although its purport was
. . . to make a better provision for the stabilization, improvement
and promotion of industrial relations . . .
it did not provide for a code of fair industrial relations nor did it au.
thorise the compilation of such a code to assist in the achievements of
its objects. There is similarly no minimum wage law operating in the contracting industry or indeed in any other industry in the country. 2 ' The
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absence of these obviously contribute to, if they are not the sole cause of,
the kinds of exploitative labour practices which is the subject of the
following sub-heading.
THE NATURE OF THE EXPLOITATIVE EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES
The Henry Commission, for the purposes of analysing the evidence
in relation to the alleged exploitative employment practices in the industry,
classified the contractors into three identifiable groups. In the first group,
there is found a relatively small number of contractors whose employees
are in most cases unionised and therefore operating under favourable terms
and conditions of employment. These are the larger contractors.
The second group comprises the "medium-sized" contractors. Their
employees may or may not be unionised. Conditions of employment within this group of contractors are less favourable than those of the former
group but still better than those in the third category.
Within the third category are the small contractors whose group
constitutes by far the majority. It is in this group that the employment
atrocities occur in their widest scale. The employees of the contractors
in this group are non-unionised, wages are low and sub-marginal, fringe
benefits are often non-existent, number of hours worked per week are
generally not specified, and overtime payments are never made.
That there is little or no unionisation in the medium-sized and small
contracting firms is not surprising because the resentful attitude of the
contractors in these two groups toward unionisation is commonplace. They
make no secret of their anti-union attitude. Instant dismissal of employees
for engaging in trade union activities or for merely indicating their
interests in trade unionism is rampant.2 6 An illustration is found in the
Industrial Court case of Motilal Moonan Ltd. v. Transport and Industrial
Workers' Union27 where a transport contractor refused an employee any
further work after an unsuccessful unionisation drive by the Transport
and Industrial Workers' Union. The reason for the refusal was that the
contractor alleged that the employee was the chief union organiser in
his business undertaking and he accordingly asked the employee to let
his union find him work. 2i Since the dismissed employee was a member
of the union his grievance was ventilated in the Industrial Court, which
held that the contractor had acted "unfairly and oppressively" towards
him. 29 These contractors go about this practice simply
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• . . by curtailment of work made available to persons known
or suspected to be actively involved in bringing about unionism
in a particular business. 30
This practice frustrates, at the incubative stage, the efforts of workers
to organise, and is evidently responsible for the absence of unionisation
in these undertakings. So the Commission found.
Further, it was found that the practices of these contractors could
not be complained of by their employees for fear of losing their jobs.
This point arose from the fact that some contractors, in an endeavour to
rationalise their practices of subcontracting work in small units to foremen and charge-hands told the Commission that their employees were
quite happy with the practice since they had never heard any complaints
to the contrary. Under this system, the foreman or charge-hand employs
a few workers to accomplish the task assigned to him. In other words,
he, at that stage, ceases to be an employee but an employer. In this way,
observed the Commission,
a . . . vicious and confused situation develops where on a single
work project, employees--be they foremen or general workersalternate between being hourly and piece workers with consequential changes from one employer to another. The natural
consequences which flow from a situation of the kind are loose
and unstable employment relationships and an extremely wide
scope for abusive employment practices.51
The most striking exploitative employment practices discovered by
the Commission existed under the system of Labour-Supply-Only Contracts.
To borrow the Commission's expression this system of subcontracting is
...nothing but an undisguised conduit through which temporary
32
and casual employment is channelled.
Under this system, the relationship of employer-employee is found to
be virtually absent." The principal company controls the subcontractor to
the point of determining who and when the latter shall fire an employee. 34
The employee is lost in this circuitous process and is without an employer."5 Although he may be employed from time to time, it could not
be properly said that he has any contract of employment in the strict
sense of that term.
The element of uncertainty was also one of the sources of the
"distrust, fear, hatred and mutual disregard" in the Guyana waterfront
as found by the Denbow Commission. The employees at the waterfront
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were uncertain as to who their employer was at any given time-whether
they were employees of member-companies of the Shipping Association
or of private contractors. They were often uncertain also as to whether
they would get work on any given day. Even where an employee has
been employed by a single contractor for a number of years, he will still
be required to report daily to ascertain whether or not he will be offered
employment for the day. This experience is also shared by employees of
the contracting industry in Trinidad and Tobago where employees of up
to fifteen years experience with a particular contractor are subjected to
such uncertain conditions of work. 3
Certainly, this kind of arrangement will inevitably breed abuses of
varying dimensions. In this connection, the Industrial Court's observa37
tions in Paramount Transport Ltd. v. Amalgamated Workers' Union
is instructive. In that case the President opined:
This system of employment lent itself readily to discriminatory
offers and allocations of work on the principle of "rewarding
friends and punishing enemies.3 8
On page four of that judgment the President went on to state that:
The system of employment which [the contractors] practice
contains most of the undesirable elements to which we have
drawn attention and we fear that these are becoming widespread that there is justification for saying that in the present
state of unemployment in the country39 the very existence of
thousands of workers has of necessity become dependent upon
the foibles, idiosyncracies and prejudices of these contractors
in a way and to a degree that was unknown even in the days of
yore when serfs were said to be tied to the soil, for the lord
of manor, at least, had a duty to maintain and protect his serf.
The social injustice visited on an individual worker by this practice
manifested itself in the results of the decision under discussion. The
Paramounts' case concerned a claim by the union that the contractor
dismissed twenty-four of his employees, members of the union. The Union
asked the Industrial Court to order the reinstatement of these workers in
accordance with the powers conferred upon it by the Industrial Stabilization Act, 1965, section 11(4) (e) under which the Court is empowered
to give such directions and do all such things as it thinks necessary or
expedient for the just determination of any trade dispute before it, and
also on the basis of the court's previous orders of reinstatement where
dismissals had appeared to it to be unfair and oppressive. 40 The Court
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thought that in the circumstances there could be no dismissal since the
relationship of employer and employee only comes into existence when
the contractor offers work to the workers. It is only then that the provisions of the Industrial Stabilization Act could be invoked. Similarly no
reinstatement could be ordered since reinstatement implies the restoration
of a worker to a regular or continuing job on which he was previously
employed before the dismissal. Thus these persons could not be described
as employees for the purposes of the Act, and could therefore not avail
41
themselves of the statute.
In addition to the above, there is the practice whereby an employee
may be required to make "gifts of gratitude" to foremen or other supervisory personnel in order that he be kept employed. The method of
payment of wages is, as in the case of the Georgetown waterfront workers,4 2 amazingly unsatisfactory. It is said that contractors sometimes make'
the employees sign pay sheets with the understanding that they will be
paid less than the sum they have signed for. On other occasions, the
employees are made to append their signatures to pay sheets without
the amount receivable stated thereon. Some contractors are in the habit
of not paying wages in envelopes with the object of not giving the worker
any documentary evidence of the amount of wages actually paid to him.
Where envelopes are used it is understood that they carry incomplete
information. With regard to these, employees receive subsistence and
sub-marginal wages, work long hours without receiving premium rates
for overtime, 43 receive no holiday pay or sickness benefit, nor severance
or redundancy payments, regardless of length of service or reason for
termination-indeed they receive no fringe benefits.
Despite the explicit stipulations of the Fair Wages Clauses, contractors engaged in public works provide no better conditions of employment
for their employees than those of the private contractors. By the Fair
Wages Clauses-apparently fashioned on the United Kingdom's Fair
Wages Resolution of the House of Commons-the Government states
its policy that contractors engaged in public projects must observe certain conditions of employment, pay minimum rates of wages under
specified guidelines, keep proper Wages and Time Books and Worksheets, and are expected to recognise the freedom of workers to join trade
unions. 44 Further, they are required not to sub-contract work without the
written permission of a person authorised by Government.
The Commission gave two explanations for the permeation of bad
employment practices into the system of awarding contracts in the public
sector. In the first instance, medium-sized and small contracts carry no
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fair wages clauses especially as these contracts are generally not entered
into on the basis of written agreements between contractors and the
Government. The second explanation goes to enforcement. The Commission
found that even where a Fair Wages stipulation is written into a contract
or agreed to orally, the principal companies are not generally concerned
with the enforcement of the conditions. Nor does the Tenders Board
undertake the duty of the supervision of the contract after its award.
There is no other body or person charged with the duty of seeing that
the Fair Wages Clauses are enforced, hence contractors easily evade them. 45
After giving "very serious consideration" to the proposal put before
them that legislation be introduced which will place greater restraint on
the right to contract out work, the Commission refrained from making
such recommendation since it considered that contracting out of work
was a "perfectly legitimate form of business the world over,"' 46 and it
47
could not think of a better alternative with which to replace the system.
Since, therefore, the Commission was committed to the system of
contracting out work they were not prepared to recommend its abolition
as they found that the present undesirable features of contracting out
work were not "in terms of the basic system itself," but were caused by
abusive practices which have permeated into the system. These practices
have been made possible through institutional deficiencies, lack of enforcement machinery or because of certain inherent features of contract
work.48 The consequences of these are that the interest and welfare of
workers suffer. It is in this connection that the Commission made their
recommendations which now call for discussion.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
It may be recalled that earlier in this article it was contended that
the undesirable and exploitative employment practices that were found in
the contracting industry of Trinidad and Tobago have been made possible
because of the absence of laws regulating the conduct of the contractors
and conditions of employment generally, and also the absence of a code
of industrial relations practice setting out guide-lines for the parties. It
was also observed that the Industrial Relations Act, 1972, omitted to
do so and that although it required the Industrial Court when determining
a trade dispute to do so in accordance with the principles and practices
49
of good industrial relations, it did not explain what the phrase means.
It has, however, been observed elsewhere that such guiding principles
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could be extracted and compiled from the experiences of the Industrial
Court as decipherable from its numerous written judgements over the
50
past eight years.
It is then not surprising that these omissions engaged the attention of
the Commission. Firstly, the Commission had to consider the proposal
urged upon them that the industry needs Minimum Wages legislation.
Under the Labour (Minimum Wages) Ordinance of 193551 (not referred
to by the Commission), the Governor in Council, where he is satisfied
that the wages paid in any occupation in the country are unreasonably
low, may, by proclamation, fix a minimum rate of wages for that occupation. 52 In effect the Commission was persuaded to recommend that a
minimum wage proclamation be made in relation to the contracting industry, and with stiff penalties for breaches." But a minimum wages
legislation as proposed was rejected since the Commission thought that
such approach would
. . .barely scratch the surface of the problem because the undesirable features of contract work in the economy extend far
54
beyond sub-standard and marginal wages.
Rather, it would prefer a "multi-faceted" approach if the various exploitative practices it encountered were to be effectively obliterated, and
if lasting results were to be aimed at. Accordingly, the Commission
recommended the enactment of a more comprehensive Minimum Terms
and Conditions of Employment Act,5 5 which will provide for a national
minimum wages, vacation with pay and sick-leave benefits for all workers
throughout the country. In addition, the Commission thought that it would
be desirable also that an Unfair Employment Practices Act with appropriate sanctions be legislated.
Furthermore, the Commission saw the need for a build-up of vibrant
trade unionism in the contracting industry. Unionisation by both the
workers and the contractors is most desirable and would inevitably achieve
a more stable and healthier employment atmosphere within the industry.
Foreseeing the springing up of numerous such associations in due course,
the Commission recommended the eventual formation of Joint Negotiating
Machinery for the bilateral determination of terms and conditions of em56
ployment and for the handling of grievances in the industry.
To ensure the effective observation of the Fair Wages Clauses, and
other regulatory clauses in collective agreements, the Commission recommended that a Contract Labour Inspection and Enforcement Unit be
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established in the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Co-operatives
with the specific duty of dealing with contract matters. The Labour
Inspector would have powers comparable to those of the already existing
7
Factory Inspector.1
As far as the practice of Labour-Supply-Only Contract is concerned,
the Commission recommended that it be "totally out-lawed in Trinidad
and Tobago. ' 58 But they were not certain about the combined effect of
sub-sections (1) (i) (iii) and (4) (b) of Section 2 of the Industrial
Relations Act, 1972 on that practice. Subsection (1) (i) (iii) defined an
employer to include
. .a person for whose benefit work or duties is or are performed by a worker under a labour only contract within the
meaning of subsection (4) (b).
Subsection (4) (b) provided that if a person engages the services of
a worker for the purpose of providing those services to another, then,
such other person shall be deemed to be the employer of the worker under
a labour-only contract. From the above definitions it becomes clear that a
worker whose employer is engaged in a labour-only contract now knows
who is his employer, and there is no other indication that the Act has
cured the ills of that practice. What these subsections have done is
recognise the existence of a contract between the parties to a labouronly contract. In other words, no judicial construction by any stroke of
imagination, nor however broad, could eradicate the mal-practices inherent
in the system. The only remedy, whether the labour-only contract practice
is retained or not, will lie on the proposed Minimum Terms and Conditions of EmploymentS9 law and the Unfair Employment Practices Act.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion brought into focus the question of lawmaking in the realm of employment. Despite the fact that the bargaining
inequality between the employer and the employee is well known, few laws
exist for the protection of the weaker of the two-the worker. Perhaps
modern law-makers tend to assume that the emergence of trade unions
and the practice of trade unionism have cured all employment ills. This
they do in apparent oblivion of those employees whose employment places
are not unionised or, for one reason or another, are non-unionisable.
Again this is responsible for the continued existence of the so-called
Masters and Servants Acts in the Statute books of most of the Caribbean
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Countries. 60 The Masters and Servants Acts were passed after the collapse
of the apprenticeship system in the West Indies; 61 no doubt they are now
out of touch with contemporary social reality.
The history of the employer-employee relationship shows that legislation has been-apart from the effects of modern trade unionism-the
only way of affording the employee protection from the might and overzealous aspirations to maximise profits of some employers. Experience,
however, shows that such legislation is often not forthcoming or only
provided as need arises and in most instances when things have gone
"radically wrong." The Commonwealth Caribbean Countries are, by far
generally lagging behind in the enactment of protective labour legislation
irrespective of the influence of the International Labour Organisation.
This means, therefore, that in the absence of protective labour legislation
62
the employee is left to the unsympathetic hands of the common law.
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, Barbados is the only country with
a Severance Payments Act. 63 The four independent countries all have
National Insurance laws 64 but none of them makes provision for unemployment benefits. Only Trinidad and Tobago, among the independent
nations, and Antigua and Dominica among the Associated States, and
the Bahamas65 have introduced legislation incorporating the I.L.O. recommendation on unfair dismissals. 66 Nowhere in the Commonwealth Caribbean is there a Code of Industrial Relations in operation. 67 To date the
Bahamas is the only country of the Commonwealth Caribbean with a
fair labour standards law, 68 which though termed Fair Labour Standards
Act, embraces the provisions which the Henry Commission had in mind
in connection with its suggested enactment of a Minimum Terms and
Conditions of Employment Act. A summary of the Bahamas Act will
therefore be of assistance.
Sections 5-7 of that Act provide for standard hours of work. Thus no
employer in the Commonwealth of the Bahama Islands shall "cause or
permit" any employee to work in excess of eight and a half hours in
69
any day or forty-eight hours in any week without payment for overtime.
The hours of work must be arranged in order to ensure that the employee
is allowed at least one day off in every week. Where he is required to
work in excess of the statutory number of hours, he must be paid overtime for that excess at the following rates:
(a)

in the case of overtime work performed on any public
holiday or day off, twice his regular rate of wages;
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(b)

in any other case, one and one-half times his regular
rate of wages.

Minimum wages provisions form the subject of Part Three of this
Act. The Minister of Labour is empowered to establish a Wages Council
for any industry or part of an industry if he thinks that no adequate
machinery exists for the effective regulation of wages and conditions of
employment, or that it is expedient having regard to the wages existing
amongst those employees. 70 Section 9 deals with the appointment and
constitution of Wages Councils. The main functions of these councils are
to submit proposals for fixing minimum wages and to render advice to
the Minister on any matter relating to conditions of employment of specified employees referred to it by the Minister. 71 On receipt of such proposals the Minister will send the proposals to the Governor who may make
a wages order giving effect to the proposals. 72 Thereupon the duty to pay
the statutory minimum wages falls on the employer and this duty cannot
be contracted out. 73 It is an offence to pay wages less than the statutory
minimum. 74 Section 14 gives direction as to the computation of wages
under the minimum wages order. Where in any industry or part of an
industry a minimum wages order is made, the employer is also under a
duty to keep records which will show whether or not the provisions of
75
the Act are being complied with. Omission to do so is an offence.
Part four deals with vacations with pay. Every employee is entitled
to, at least, one week's holiday with pay in respect of every completed
year of employment, 76 in addition to payment of wages for each public
holiday occurring during the vacation. Rules relating to the calculation
of vacation pay where the employment is terminated during the course
77
of the year are also specified.
The Fair Labour Standards Act also deals with the administration
of the matters discussed above. The Minister of Labour may designate
any public officer as the Inspector whose functions will concern the
enforcement of the Act or regulations made under it. The duties of this
functionary are outlined in sections 27 to 33 and they include the power
to inspect and examine all books, payrolls and records of an employer
relating to wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment
affecting the employees. The Minister is expected to make an annual
report on the administration of this Act 78 to the Legislature.
The concept of a code of industrial relations is not new in the
Commonwealth Caribbean for in 1956 a Labour Code was prepared for
the Government of Barbados through the technical assistance programme
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of the International Labour Office. 79 Similarly, a Fair Labour Code was
drafted in Jamaica in 1962 after a tripartite agreement was reached.3 0
But like the Barbados Code, the Jamaican Fair Labour Code did not
come into operation. The enquiries of the writer reveal that arrange.
ments are being made in both Dominica and Guyana for the compilation
of Labour Codes to guide the employment relationship in those countries.
Among the most recent Labour Codes"' that have been introduced
in member-countries of the International Labour Organisation is the
United Kingdom Code of Industrial Relations Practice. The United Kingdom Code, compiled in accordance with section 2 of the country's Industrial Relations Act, 1971, was laid before the U.K. Parliament on January
19th, 1972 and came into operation a month after. The Code is not
supposed to be a binding legal document82 but it is intended to give
practical guidance to the employers, trade unions and individual employees. It stresses the four cardinal principles of good industrial relations
embodied in the Act itself, namely: free conduct of collective bargaining,
orderly procedures for settling labour disputes, free association of workers
and employers, and freedom and security for workers.83
Furthermore, the purport of the Code is to encourage and assist the
parties concerned with the day-to-day problems of labour relations to
achieve co-operation, the essence of good industrial relations. It emphasises the importance of good human relations based on trust and confidence as essential ingredients of productivity in the industry. One essential
feature of the Code is that it applies wherever people are employed,
that is to say, in unionised as well as non-unionised employment places.
But as Heppel and O'Higgins point out, some of its details may need
to be adapted to suit the particular circumstances of, especially, small
establishments. In any event, such adaptations must not be contrary to
the spirit of the Code.
In a nutshell, the United Kingdom Code deals with the following
matters:
(a)

The responsibilities of management, trade unions, em.
ployers' associations and the individual employees towards
a healthy industrial relations atmosphere;

(b)

guidelines for the planning and use of manpower, recruitment and selection, training, payment systems, status of
employees and their job security and working conditions;
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(c)

communication and consultation being essential and necessary to promote operational efficiency and mutual understanding, the code outlines under what circumstances
communication and consultation must be made;

(d)

the rules and procedures to be followed for the purpose
of free collective bargaining, the bargaining unit, recognition, collective agreements and the requirement that the
employer disclose information relevant to the negotiations
84
in hand;

(e)

the appointment, qualifications, status and functions of the
workers' representatives in the industry, facilities and
training of such persons are also regulated;

(f)

guidelines for the establishment of individual grievance
procedures and collective disputes procedures in every
establishment; and

(g)

disciplinary procedures in every employment undertaking.

The findings of the Henry Enquiry reveal, beyond doubt, the lacunae
in the law relating to the relationship of employer-employee in the Commonwealth Caribbean, thus making it absolutely clear and necessary that
legislative intervention is urgently needed. In fact, Commonwealth Caribbean countries need to make a fresh start by statutorily regulating their
respective laws of employment. The employment circumstances above
described-which are perhaps not necessarily peculiar to the Trinidad
and Tobago industry for similar practices may well be in operation in
various industries in the region-have underscored the need for the
introduction of effective measures to curb undesirable practices thereby
giving the worker the protection he needs for a continued subsistence
and a better standard of life in accordance with the spirit of the constitution. The first step should be: the repeal of the now obsolete Masters and
Servants laws, the antiquated Minimum Wages legislation and Wages
Councils Ordinances and their replacement with a Minimum Terms and
Conditions of Employment Act which will include, as part of its provisions, the worker's right to recover for severance or redundancy payments,
provide for minimum length of notice to terminate the employment contract and the regulation of these and other matters recommended by the
Henry Commission. These provisions will set minimum terms and conditions while the parties will be at liberty to bargain for higher terms. A
compilation of labour codes laying down basic principles of good indus-
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trial relations and for the guidance of the parties in industry should be
undertaken in Commonwealth Caribbean Countries. Although one should
not be taken as saying that what is good industrial relations in the
Bahamas or the United Kingdom will necessarily be regarded as such
in either Trinidad and Tobago or Guyana, it is necessary that if reform
of the kind advocated is acceptable, a study of the Bahamas Act and the
United Kingdom Code of Industrial Relations Practice will serve as starting point to these ends. In the final analysis, however, any legislation
introduced or code compiled must be based on the local industrial relations experience of the particular country.
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APPENDIX
The incidence of unemployment in Trinidad and Tobago between
the period December, 1966 and June, 1971 can be illustrated by
the following table:
Period

31.12.66
30.6.67
31.12.67
30.6.68
31.12.68
30.6.69
31.12.69
30.6.70
31.12.70
30.6.71

Total Labour
Force

Total
Unemployed

350,600
368,200
363,700
363,800
360,200
368,400
360,900
366,200
360,900
367,800

50,800
51,200
56,200
52,700
55,400
50,100
46,000
45,800
47,000
46,400

Unemployed as a

% o1 Labour Force
14
14
15
14
15
14
13
12
13
13

Source: Central Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago

